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One of the strongest trends in recent macroeconomic modeling of labor market fluctuations is to treat
unemployment inflows as acyclical.  This trend stems in large part from an influential paper by Shimer
on "Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment," i.e., the extent to which increased unemployment
during a recession arises from an increase in the number of unemployment spells versus an increase
in their duration.  After broadly reviewing the previous literature, we replicate and extend Shimer's
main analysis.  Like Shimer, we find an important role for increased duration.  But contrary to Shimer's
conclusions, we find that even his own methods and data, when viewed in an appropriate metric, reveal
an important role for increased inflows to unemployment as well.  This finding is further strengthened
by our refinements of Shimer's methods of correcting for data problems and by our detailed examination
of particular components of the inflow to unemployment.  We conclude that a complete understanding
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The Ins and Outs of Cyclical Unemployment 
 
1.  Introduction 
  In principle, the increased unemployment during a recession could arise from an 
increase in the number of unemployment spells, an increase in the duration of 
unemployment spells, or both.  Equivalently, one can decompose the cyclical variation in 
unemployment into changes in the rates of inflow to and outflow from unemployment.  
The title of a 1986 paper by Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant dubbed this subject “The Ins 
and Outs of Unemployment.”  Because Darby et al. claimed that cyclical unemployment 
variation in the United States stems almost entirely from cyclical variation in the inflow, 
their paper’s subtitle was “The Ins Win.” 
  Contrary to that conclusion, one of the strongest trends in recent macroeconomic 
modeling of the labor market is to treat the inflow to unemployment as acyclical.  In 
some instances, acyclicality of the inflow is assumed; in others, the model is designed to 
explain the supposed acyclicality of the inflow.  Examples include Hall (2005a, 2005b), 
Gertler and Trigari (2006), Menzio and Moen (2006), Rotemberg (2006), and Blanchard 
and Gali (2006).  Several of these authors motivate their treatment of the inflow as 
acyclical by referring to a pair of papers by Shimer (2005a, 2005b), which reach a 
conclusion diametrically opposite to that of Darby et al.  For example, the introductory 
passage in the first of these, entitled “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment,” 
declares, “Using United States data from 1948 to 2004, I find that there are substantial 
fluctuations in unemployed workers’ job finding probability at business cycle   2
frequencies, while employed workers’ separation probability is comparatively acyclic.”
1  
Similar statements appear in Shimer (2005b and 2005c).
2 
  Viewed in the context of a longer history of unemployment studies, the opposite 
conclusions of Darby et al. and Shimer both seem surprising.  Darby et al.’s finding that 
“The Ins Win” and the outs lose appears to be contradicted by a large body of 
accumulated evidence suggesting that unemployment duration is substantially 
countercyclical: 
•  Regularly published statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of unemployment 
duration from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) show a pronounced 
shift towards longer unemployment spells during recessions.  Similarly, 
sophisticated econometric analyses that have used repeated CPS cross-sectional 
data on unemployment duration to impute month-to-month hazard rates for 
exiting unemployment have found these outflow rates to be substantially 
procyclical (Sider, 1985; Baker, 1992
3). 
•  Numerous studies have estimated inflow and outflow rates with the so-called 
gross flows data, which are based on the 2/3 or so of the CPS sample that can be 
longitudinally matched from one month to the next.
4  Without exception, these 
                                                 
1 Shimer uses the term “separation probability” to mean the probability of entering unemployment.  We do 
not use this terminology for two reasons.  First, we wish to avoid confusion with the more commonly used 
meaning of “separation” as a quit or layoff from a particular employer, which often involves no 
unemployment at all (especially in the case of quits).  Second, as we will emphasize in section 2.D of this 
paper, many spells of unemployment begin with entry into the labor force, not a separation from 
employment. 
2 Similarly, the abstract of Hall’s Review of Economics and Statistics Lecture (2005b) says, “In the modern 
U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs.  Unemployment rises because jobs are hard 
to find, not because an unusual number of people are thrown into unemployment.” 
3 Baker’s study, which disaggregated unemployment by reason for unemployment and demographic 
characteristics, directly refuted the conjecture by Darby et al. that the apparent cyclicality of unemployment 
duration could be explained mostly by cyclical changes in the composition of the unemployed. 
4 While the gross flows data are useful, they are not necessarily the data source of choice because they are 
plagued by numerous deficiencies, including the systematic exclusion of individuals who change residence   3
studies have found that the monthly hazard rate for outflow from unemployment 
is procyclical (Perry, 1972; Marston, 1976; Blanchard and Diamond, 1990; 
Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer, 1999; Fujita and Ramey, 2006; Yashiv, 2006).  
•  Regularly published statistics on unemployment insurance (UI) claims show that, 
during recessions, UI claims tend to be of considerably longer duration, and the 
fraction of claimants that exhaust their entitlement to benefits is considerably 
higher (Nicholson, 1981; Kennan, 2006).  These facts, of course, are precisely 
why the federal government usually adopts extended-benefit programs during 
recessions. 
 
Shimer’s opposite conclusion that the outs win and the ins lose also appears to be 
contradicted by a great deal of evidence: 
•  The regularly published CPS statistics on unemployment duration show that the 
number unemployed less than five weeks (who therefore became unemployed 
since the previous month’s CPS) tends to be substantially higher during 
recessions. 
•  The same studies of CPS gross flows data that have found procyclical flows out of 
unemployment also have found substantially countercyclical flows into 
unemployment.
5 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the many spurious transitions generated by misclassification in either of the months used in the 
longitudinal match.  See National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics (1979, pp. 
214-17) and Barkume and Horvath (1995). 
5 The familiar finding of substantial cyclicality in both directions of gross flows between employment and 
unemployment is replicated in section 3 of Shimer (2005a).  In our paper, instead of reanalyzing the gross 
flows data still again, we concentrate on replicating, extending, and interpreting the main analysis in 
Shimer’s section 2, which his first page describes as the basis of his “preferred measures.”   4
•  Regularly published statistics on initial UI claims show that dramatically more UI 
claims are initiated during recessions, especially early in recessions (Kennan, 
2006).  This, of course, is why the Conference Board uses initial UI claims as one 
of its “leading indicators.” 
•  All these indications of countercyclical inflows into unemployment dovetail with 
well-established facts about labor turnover, including the recent employer-based 
evidence on countercyclical job destruction as well as a long history of evidence 




Reacting to the apparent discrepancy between these patterns and Shimer’s 
influential conclusion, in this paper we reassess Shimer’s reassessment.  Shimer’s 
preferred analysis uses an ingenious methodology to infer the unemployment inflow and 
outflow rates from only three published monthly time series from the CPS: the number 
employed, the number unemployed, and the number unemployed less than five weeks.   
As Shimer rightly emphasizes, one of the virtues of his approach is “making it easy for 
others to verify my results, extend them as more data become available, and examine 
their consistency both within the United States and across countries.”  Thanks to the 
public availability of the data and the transparency of Shimer’s method, we can indeed 
replicate and extend his analysis. 
                                                 
6 As noted by Hall (2006), the countercyclicality of layoffs is no greater than the procyclicality of quits.  
This point was previously documented by Slichter (1919), Woytinsky (1942), Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen 
(1988), Anderson and Meyer (1994), and others.  Davis (2006) clearly explains why distinguishing layoffs 
from quits is important for understanding cyclical fluctuations in the labor market.    5
We confirm his finding that the majority of cyclical unemployment variation can 
be attributed to cyclicality in the outflow hazard, but we also find that, when viewed in an 
appropriate metric, Shimer’s own results indicate that increased inflows also are 
important in most recessions, especially the most severe ones.  We then propose and 
implement modifications of Shimer’s methods for treating the 1994 CPS redesign, time 
aggregation bias, and heterogeneity in flow rates across job losers, job leavers, and labor 
force entrants.  All our refinements of Shimer’s analysis continue to find substantial 
cyclicality in both inflows and outflows. 
In light of that finding, we caution against the recent tendency of macroeconomic 
theorists to overlook the cyclicality of unemployment inflows.  A complete understanding 
of cyclical unemployment requires an explanation of countercyclical unemployment 
inflow rates as well as procyclical outflow rates.  We also discuss more generally what 
can be learned about the business cycle from performing mechanical decompositions of 
cyclical unemployment variation into inflow and outflow components.  We explain why 
some of the cyclical variation in the outflow hazard may be caused by cyclical changes in 
the size and composition of the inflow, and we suggest that cyclical changes in both 
inflows and outflows stem from the same source – whatever it is that shifts the derived 
demand for labor leftward during a recession. 
 
2.  Replication, Reinterpretation, and Extension of Shimer’s Main Analysis 
A.  Some Useful Identities 
Shimer starts with the following description of the evolution over time of the 
number unemployed:   6
  () ( ) ()
*
tt t t t t t t t
du
sl u f u s f u u
dt
=− − = − + −  (1) 
where lt and ut are the labor force and unemployment stocks respectively, ut
* is steady 
state unemployment, and st and ft are the unemployment inflow and outflow hazard rates.  
It should be mentioned at the outset that equation (1) accurately describes the evolution 
of unemployment only if all inflows into unemployment originate from employment.  In 
fact, however, around 40% of the stock of unemployed workers report that their 
unemployment originated from non-participation in the labor force.  We will address this 
issue in detail in section 2.D, but for now we maintain Shimer’s simplifying assumption. 
The focus of interest, then, is on the two flow rates st and ft.  As many previous 
studies have shown, and as we will confirm, since (st + ft) is typically close to 0.5 on a 
monthly basis, the half life of a deviation from steady state unemployment is close to one 
month.  In other words, the evolution of the actual unemployment rate, which we denote 












  In what follows, a recurring theme will be the decomposition of changes in the 
observed unemployment rate into a contribution due to changes in the inflow rate and a 
contribution due to changes in the outflow rate.  It turns out that equation (2) provides us 
with a remarkably simple decomposition.  In particular, log differentiation of (2) yields 
  %% ( )[ ] log 1 log log tt tt du u ds d f ≈− −  (3) 
Equivalently, multiplying (3) through by  t u %  yields 
  %% ( )[ ] 1 log log tt tt t du u u d s d f ≈− − %  (4)   7
Expressed in either way, the equation provides a decomposition in which the 
contributions of the inflow and outflow rates are separable and may be compared on an 
equal footing with respect to their impact on the unemployment rate.
7  To obtain a 
transparent view of the relative contributions of the inflow and outflow rates, all one need 
do is compare the log variation in the two flows.  In what follows, we will emphasize the 
formulation in (3) because, with 1 t u − %  close to 1, the log changes in  t s  and  t f  translate 
almost one-to-one into proportional changes in the unemployment rate.   
 
B.  Replication and Reinterpretation of Shimer’s Original Analysis 
As noted by Shimer, a significant virtue of his methodology is the ease of its 
replication.  In this spirit, we use the same, publicly available, seasonally adjusted CPS 
data on the number employed, the number unemployed, and the number unemployed less 
than five weeks (henceforth “short-term unemployment”) for each month from 1948 
through 2004.
8   
Shimer’s analysis involves two corrections to these time series.  First, as 
discussed by Polivka and Miller (1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2001), the 1994 
redesign of the CPS changed the way the survey measures unemployment duration for all 
of the survey’s eight “rotation groups” except the first and fifth.
9  The resulting reduction 
                                                 
7 In contrast, it is more difficult to interpret the “counterfactual” analysis performed in Shimer’s paper.  In 
particular, to assess the importance of the outflow rate in explaining changes in unemployment, he 
calculates the unemployment rate that would have prevailed if the inflow rate were always at its temporal 
mean,  () / t s sf + .  Clearly, however, a different answer would obtain if the inflow rate were held constant 
at a different value. 
8 These data are readily obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, www.bls.gov.  
9 In the CPS sample design, an address selected into the sample remains in the sample for four consecutive 
months, is temporarily rotated out of the sample for eight months, and then is rotated back in for four more 
months before being permanently retired from the sample.  The first and fifth rotation groups are 
respectively the addresses in the survey for the first time and those reentering after the eight-month hiatus.    8
in the number counted as short-term unemployed induced a discontinuity in the series.  
Shimer’s main method of correcting for the discontinuity is, in each month from 1994 on,  
to inflate the official count of short-term unemployment by that month’s ratio of the 
short-term share of unemployment in the first and fifth rotation groups (obtained from the 
CPS microdata) to the short-term share for the full sample.  Equivalently, he multiplies 
the official count of all unemployment by the short-term share in only the first and fifth 
rotation groups.  This treats the discontinuity because, even since 1994, the first and fifth 
rotation groups’ unemployment duration has been measured in the same way as the full 
sample’s was before 1994.  In this section’s replication, we use Shimer’s correction 
method, but in section 2.C we will implement a variation of the method that we believe is 
even better. 
Second, instead of just using the monthly time series to calculate monthly 
transition rates, Shimer devises an ingenious way of inferring continuous-time inflow and 
outflow hazard rates, st and ft.  Inferring the outflow hazard rate is relatively 
straightforward.  First calculate the probability that a typical unemployed worker leaves 
unemployment in the month between consecutive CPS surveys, Ft, using the identity 
  11
s
ttt t uuF u ++ Δ=−  (5) 
where Δut+1 is the monthly change in the number unemployed between month t and 
month t + 1, and ut+1
s is the number unemployed less than five weeks in month t + 1.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The crucial change in the 1994 redesign was that, in all rotation groups except the first and fifth, 
unemployed individuals who also were unemployed as of the previous month’s interview were no longer 
asked about their unemployment duration.  Instead, their unemployment duration was measured as the 
previous month’s value incremented by the number of weeks between the two monthly interviews.     9










=− .  This can then be 
mapped into the outflow hazard,  ( ) log 1 tt f F =− − . 
  Inferring the inflow hazard is more difficult.  The reason is that some workers 
who flow into the unemployment pool after one month’s CPS also exit unemployment 
before the next month’s survey. As a result, the measured stock of short-term 
unemployed workers in any CPS is in fact an underestimate of the number of workers 
who flowed into the unemployment pool over the course of the preceding month.  The 
latter is what Shimer refers to as time aggregation bias.
10 
  To correct for time aggregation bias, Shimer solves (1), the differential equation 
for the evolution of the unemployment rate, forward one month under the assumptions 
that the flows, st and ft, and the labor force, lt, are constant between surveys: 
  ( ) ( )
**
1 exp tt t t t t uuu u s f + ⎡ ⎤ =+ − −+ ⎣ ⎦  (6) 
Since we obtain a measure of the outflow rate ft from the method above, and since we 
observe ut and ut+1, the unemployment rates at the beginning and end of the month, we 
can solve (6) for the inflow hazard st. 
  Following Shimer’s method provides us with measures of the inflow and outflow 
rates for each month from 1948 through 2004.  As a final step, to obtain what Shimer 
refers to as his preferred measures of unemployment inflow and outflow rates, we take 
quarterly averages of these monthly series to obtain smoother series.   
                                                 
10 Note that there is no analogous time aggregation problem in the measurement of unemployment outflows 
due to unemployed workers leaving unemployment and re-entering between CPS surveys.  The reason is 
that the CPS in theory picks up all such workers, as they will be measured as unemployed less than five 
weeks.   10
In our figure 1 we replicate Shimer’s figure 1 and display the quarterly time series 
of the probabilities of flowing in or out of unemployment over the course of a month 
based on Shimer’s methodology.  To the untrained eye, figure 1 might give the 
impression that the cyclical variation in the inflow to unemployment is dwarfed by the 
variation in the outflow from unemployment.  However, a key lesson from equation (3) in 
our section 2.A is that a more apt comparison is between the variation in the logarithms 
of the inflow and outflow hazard rates.  Figure 2 displays these log flows.  Note that, 
since the range of the vertical axes measuring these two log flows is the same, equal-
sized variation in either plot will have an equal-sized impact on the log unemployment 
rate. 
Inspection of figure 2 reveals substantial variation in log inflow rates in all 
recessions except the two most recent (the relatively mild 1990 and 2001 recessions).  
Thus it is by no means clear that the inflow rate into unemployment is, in Shimer’s 
words, “comparatively acyclic” relative to the outflow rate, except in these recent 
recessions. 
A natural question at this point is what fraction of the increase in unemployment 
during a recession is due to increases in the inflow rate into unemployment, and what 
fraction is due to declines in the outflow rate?  Thanks to the decomposition presented in 
section 2.A, such a question is straightforward to answer.  We first identified start and 
end dates for the unemployment ramp-up in each recession from 1948 on.
11  We then 
                                                 
11 In practice, the start dates were determined by the most recent minimum quarterly unemployment rate 
preceding each NBER recession start date, and the end dates by the highest quarterly unemployment rate 
following each NBER recession end date.  The NBER recession dates were not used as their focus is not on 
recessionary unemployment, but rather principally on GDP growth, and they thereby miss a large portion of 
the cyclical ramp-up in unemployment.  Figure 0 displays these dates along with the time series for the 
unemployment rate.   11
calculated the difference in the log inflow rate and log outflow rate relative to their start-
of-recession values for each recession in turn.  Figure 3 plots the change in the log inflow 
rate and the negative of the change in the log outflow rate (in accordance with equation 
(3)) for each quarter of each recession since 1948 using our replication of Shimer’s 
preferred data. 
  Figure 3 reveals a number of insights.  First, consistent with Shimer’s results, we 
observe that the outflow rate from unemployment fell in most recessions by about 30 to 
50 log points.  Thus, variation in the outflow rate from unemployment is a crucial aspect 
of cyclical unemployment.  And it is true that the outflow rate explains the majority of 
the cumulative peak-to-trough rise in unemployment over the cycle, with a greater 
relative impact later on in a recession.   
However, figure 3 confirms that inflow rates also have played a substantial role in 
generating cyclical unemployment historically.  In particular, we observe that the inflow 
into unemployment typically rose by around 20 to 40 log points from peak to trough, 
except in the last two recessions.
12  We also observe that the effects of inflows tend to be 
strongest at the start of recessions, in contrast to the effects of the outflow rate.  Thus, 
graphed in an appropriate metric, Shimer’s own data show that, until the two recent 
recessions, there was something like a 35:65 inflow/outflow split of the overall increase 
in unemployment, with relatively more weight on inflows earlier on and outflows later on 
in a recession.  Thus, Shimer’s claim that the inflow rate is “nearly acyclical” is an 
overstatement at best. 
                                                 
12 For both outflows and inflows, the changes in log points appear small in the major recession period of the 
early 1980s because we break the period into two separate recessions.   12
  Figure 3 also highlights the difference in unemployment patterns between the last 
two recessions and the many prior recessions.  In the last two recessions, especially the 
one of the early 1990s, aggregate inflows into unemployment moved comparatively little.  
Thus, weak aggregate inflow effects, as measured in Shimer’s preferred analysis, appear 
to be a feature of these last two recessions rather than a stylized fact of recessionary 
unemployment as a whole.  In any case, in the next two sections, we shall see reasons to 
question figure 3’s depiction of the most recent recessions.  In section 2.C, we shall see 
that the apparent weakness of inflow effects in the 2000/01 recession varies with the 
method of correcting for the CPS redesign.  And our disaggregate analysis in section 2.D 
will reveal that the aggregate picture presented in figure 3 masks some important 
heterogeneity in the effects of different inflow rates for different sub-groups of the 
unemployed.  In the end, the inflow effects in the last recession will not look so different 
from those in prior recessions. 
 
C.  Modifications of Shimer’s Correction Methods 
Shimer’s analysis is based on publicly available data from the CPS, but it also 
depends on the particular corrections he makes for the CPS redesign and time 
aggregation bias.  We agree that corrections are called for and that Shimer’s correction 
methods are reasonable first steps, but we also think the methods can be improved on.  In 
this section, we propose refinements of the correction methods and present the results 
from applying them.   
As mentioned above, to treat the discontinuity in the short-term unemployment 
series induced by the 1994 CPS redesign, Shimer multiplies the official unemployment   13
count in each month from 1994 on by the month’s short-term share of unemployment for 
only the first and fifth rotation groups, whose unemployment duration measurement was 
unaffected by the redesign.  As Shimer acknowledges in his appendix, a drawback of this 
approach is that it bases each month’s estimated short-term share on only about one-
quarter of the unemployed in the CPS sample and therefore multiplies the sampling 
variance of the estimate by about four.  The resulting noise in the corrected series can 
make it more difficult to discern the true cyclical variation in unemployment flows since 
1994.  This noise from sampling error would get worse still in our section 2.D, when we 
disaggregate the unemployed into job losers, job leavers, and labor force entrants. 
An alternative approach that can yield a more stable corrected series for short-
term unemployment over the post-redesign era is to multiply the official short-term 
unemployment series by the era’s average of the ratio of the short-term share for the first 
and fifth rotation groups to the full sample’s short-term share.  Indeed, in footnote 27 of 
his appendix, Shimer’s mentions an alternative analysis in which he multiplied the post-
redesign short-term unemployment by a constant correction factor of 1.10, but he does 
not explain his choice of 1.10.  Statistics he reports in his appendix seem to indicate that 
44.2/37.9 = 1.166 would be a more appropriate choice.  Our own analysis of CPS 
microdata from February 1994 (the first month that unemployment duration was 
measured in the new way for all rotation groups except the first and fifth) through 
January 2005 finds an average ratio of 1.1549.
13  We therefore produce a less noisy post-
redesign series by simply multiplying the official short-term unemployment by 1.1549 in 
each month from February 1994 on. 
                                                 
13 Based on different information from the CPS “parallel survey,” Polivka and Miller (1998) suggest an 
even higher correction factor of 1/.830 = 1.205.   14
To get a sense of the practical difference between Shimer’s and our methods of 
correcting for the CPS redesign, Figure 4 plots the month-by-month scaling factor used 
by Shimer, together with our scaling factor.  It can be seen that the month-by-month 
correction factor displays considerable volatility and little obvious systematic trend 
around our correction factor of 1.1549. 
Figure 5 displays the effects of our alternative redesign correction on the 
decomposition of cyclical unemployment in the last recession, along with the previous 
five recessions by way of comparison.  It can be seen that our less noisy correction for the 
1994 redesign reveals a substantially more pronounced effect of the inflow rate in the 
2001 recession.  In particular, the inflow contribution in the last recession no longer looks 
so different from the inflow contributions in some of the earlier recessions.   
Shimer’s other correction seeks to avoid the time aggregation bias that would 
result from missing unemployment spells that begin after one month’s CPS and end 
before the next month’s survey.  As explained in our section 2.B, Shimer’s approach is to 
impute continuous-time hazard rates for the unemployment inflow.  The trouble with this 
approach is that it is at odds with the discrete weekly nature of the CPS labor force 
definitions.  Each month’s CPS interviews take place during the week containing the 19
th 
of the month, and the labor force questions pertain to the “reference week” containing the 
12
th.  Someone who works at any time during the reference week is counted as employed.  
In contrast, a continuous-time perspective views someone who quits one job effective 
5:00 pm. on Friday and starts a new job at 9:00 a.m. the following Monday as 
unemployed every instant between those two times.  That definition of an unemployment   15
spell is debatable and, in any case, is inconsistent with the official labor force definitions 
underlying the employment and unemployment series that we and Shimer are analyzing. 
We therefore propose a discrete weekly analog to Shimer’s correction method, 
which deals with time aggregation bias in a way that coheres with the official labor force 
definitions.  The details are in our appendix.  Similarly to Shimer’s correction, ours boils 
down to the solution to a non-linear equation in the weekly inflow probability st
w, and the 
weekly outflow probability, ft
w: 




tt t t t t uu u u s f + =+− − −  (7) 
where 
* w
t u  is the steady-state weekly unemployment stock. 
Figure 6 illustrates both the discrete-time and continuous-time (Shimer) corrected 
log inflow hazard rates, along with the uncorrected inflow rate for comparison.
14  As 
expected, both aggregation bias corrections raise the level of estimated inflow rates, since 
they seek to add back on inflows that subsequently exited unemployment between survey 
dates.  In particular, the continuous-time correction increases the level of the measured 
inflow rate by about 30 log points, while the discrete-time correction does so by around 
23 log points.  Thus, Shimer’s continuous-time correction arguably over-corrects for time 
aggregation bias in the sense that it imputes short unemployment spells that the official 
statistics would not recognize as unemployment spells even if the CPS took place every 
single week.   
In addition, figure 6 reveals that, since the aggregation bias corrections raise the 
level of estimated inflow rates, they reduce the log change in the inflow rate over the 
                                                 
14 To isolate the effects of the alternative corrections for time aggregation bias, all the series plotted in 
figure 6 use our correction for the 1994 redesign.    16
cycle.
15  Simple least squares regressions of corrected log inflow rates on the uncorrected 
log inflow rate reveal coefficients of 0.78 for Shimer’s continuous-time correction and 
0.85 for the discrete-time correction, consistent with the notion that correcting for 
aggregation bias limits the capacity for inflows to explain cyclical unemployment.  The 
latter also reveals that, because the weekly correction affects the inflow level to a lesser 
extent than the continuous-time correction, it also preserves more of the log variation in 
inflow rates over time, and thereby in theory affords greater potential for inflows to 
explain cyclical unemployment. 
  Figure 7 compares the inflow contributions implied by the two alternative 
corrections for aggregation bias, as well as the contributions based on no correction at 
all.
16   The starkest finding is that failing to correct for time aggregation bias does indeed 
apportion a greater role to the inflow rate, and therefore correcting for that bias is 
important.  It is also true that the weekly correction places marginally greater emphasis 
on inflows than the continuous-time correction, but quantitatively the effects are small.  
Thus, the results based on the refined aggregation correction methods are broadly similar 




                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, this occurs for a slightly different reason from that highlighted by Shimer, who argues 
that “ignoring time aggregation will bias a researcher towards finding a countercyclical separation 
probability, because when the job finding probability falls, a worker who loses her job is more likely to 
experience a measured spell of unemployment.”  In fact, we find that the aggregation bias corrections have 
little effect on the countercyclicality of the level of the inflow rate. But, by raising the overall level of the 
inflow rate, they reduce the countercyclicality of the log inflow rate, which is what matters for the 
statistical decomposition of cyclical variation in unemployment. 
16 For all three of these approaches to time aggregation bias, this figure’s contributions for the most recent 
recession are based on our correction for the 1994 CPS redesign.   17
D.  Disaggregation by Reason for Unemployment 
Until now, we have been concentrating on aggregate unemployment flows based 
on Shimer’s preferred analysis.  As noted at the beginning of section 2.A, however, 
Shimer’s analysis ignores that almost half of unemployment comes from non-
participation in the labor force, not employment.  In this section, we extend the analysis 
to incorporate flows from non-participation.  At the same time, we also distinguish 
employment-to-unemployment flows stemming from job loss and from job leaving, as 
these two flows have very different cyclical properties.   
The disaggregated analysis in this section uses data on the number unemployed by 
reason, the number unemployed for less than five weeks by reason, and aggregate series 
for employment and non-participation.  Our disaggregation of unemployment by reason 
uses three categories: job losers, job leavers, and labor force entrants.
17  The complete 
requisite series for short-term unemployment by reason are not available on the BLS 
website, so we have based this section’s analysis on data from the monthly BLS 
Employment and Earnings publications.  Even those data for short-term unemployment 
by reason extend back only to May 1968 and are not seasonally adjusted.  For internal 
consistency, we start with the seasonally unadjusted Employment and Earnings data for 
all the series used in this section.  As in section 2.C, we treat the 1994 discontinuity in the 
short-term unemployment series by multiplying each published short-term unemployment 
number from February 1994 on by an average ratio of the short-term share of 
                                                 
17 We do not further disaggregate job losers into temporary layoffs and permanent job losers for two 
reasons.  First, the temporary layoff information is available only back to 1976.  Second, as explained in 
Polivka and Miller (1998), the 1994 CPS redesign caused a discontinuity in the way the two types of job 
losers are distinguished.  Similarly, we do not disaggregate labor force entrants into new entrants and re-
entrants because the 1994 redesign instituted a major change in the way the two types of entrants are 
distinguished.   18
unemployment in the first and fifth rotation groups to the corresponding short-term share 
for the full sample.  In particular, based on the CPS microdata from February 1994 
through January 2005, we calculate correction factors of 1.0958 for job losers, 1.1644 for 
job leavers, and 1.2272 for labor force entrants.  Finally, we seasonally adjust all the 
series with Eviews’ implementation of the Census Bureau’s X-12 procedure. 
Given the resulting data, it is again straightforward to calculate monthly outflow 











=− , where a subscript r denotes reason.  And, as in the 
aggregate case, we can calculate the associated outflow hazards by reason, 
() log 1 rt rt f F =− − .  As detailed in our appendix, we treat time aggregation bias with an 
extension of our discrete-time correction, which produces a corrected inflow hazard srt 
for each type of unemployment. 
Figure 8 displays the time series for each of these inflow rates.  It reveals stark 
heterogeneity in the cyclical properties of the three inflow hazards.  The job loser inflow 
is clearly countercyclical, displaying prominent upward spikes in all recessions.  By 
contrast, the job leaver inflow rate is prominently procyclical (which is not so surprising 
given the procyclicality of quit rates noted above in footnote 6).  Finally, the inflow from 
non-participation is comparatively acyclical. 
The latter three observations might come as no surprise to a reader of the past 
literature on labor flows, or indeed to any non-economist for that matter.  However, it has 
an important implication with respect to Shimer’s analysis.  Concentrating on the 
aggregate inflow rate conflates loser and leaver inflows that move in opposite directions   19
over the cycle, and in addition it averages them with a broadly acyclical inflow of 
entrants.  Looking only at an aggregate inflow has the effect of masking the individual 
contributions of each of these inflow rates that move in different cyclical directions. 
 Figure 9 displays the analogous results for outflow rates by type.  This figure 
exhibits two types of heterogeneity.  First, job losers show considerably lower outflow 
rates (and hence longer unemployment spells) than do leavers and entrants.  This fact 
combined with the countercyclicality of losers’ share of the inflow constitutes the kernel 
of truth in the argument by Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1986): One reason the 
aggregate outflow rate declines in a recession is the increased inflow share of job losers, 
whose outflow rates are relatively low.  As shown by Baker (1992) (and reaffirmed in 
Shimer’s section 4), however, this composition effect is not nearly strong enough to 
justify Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant’s conclusion that “The Ins Win.”  Interpreted in the 
framework of our equation (3), the estimates in Baker’s tables 1 and 3 indicate that 
adjusting for this composition effect decreases the share of cyclical unemployment due to 
cyclicality in outflow rates from 57 percent to 49 percent.  Thus, Baker’s results are 
altogether consistent with our conclusion that both the ins and outs of unemployment are 
empirically important. 
Second, figure 9 shows that the outflow rate is especially procyclical for job 
losers.  Because the outflow rate also is quite procyclical for the other two types of 
unemployed, though, aggregating the various outflow rates is much less problematic than 
aggregation of the inflows. 
To get a sense of the individual contributions of each of the inflow and outflow 
rates by reason, we again seek to decompose the change in the log unemployment rate   20
into components due to each of the flows.  To this end, note first that we can split the 
aggregate unemployment rate into the sum of the unemployment rates for each reason, 
%% % %
qe uu u u λ =++ , where subscripts λ, q, and e refer to job losers, job leavers (quits), and 
labor force entrants respectively.  Log differentiation of the latter reveals that the change 
in the log unemployment rate is equal to the share-weighted sum of the log changes in the 
constituent sub unemployment rates: 
  %% % % log log log log qe qe du du du du λ λ ωωω =++  (8) 
where ωr is the unemployment share of reason r.  In steady state, the three sub 
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 (9) 
where e and i denote employment and non-participation as a fraction of the labor force.  
It turns out that the log variation in both e and i over time is minuscule relative to the 
cyclical variation in log unemployment (see figure 10).  Thus, a very good approximation 
over the few quarters represented by a recessionary ramp-up in unemployment is that 
log 0 log de di ≈≈ .  This yields the following very simple approximate decomposition: 
  % [ ] [ ] log log log log log log log qq q e e e du ds df ds df ds df λλ λ ωωω ⎡⎤ ≈− +− + − ⎣⎦  (10) 
Figure 11 displays the results of this decomposition.  Specifically, it plots the 
contribution of each unemployment flow, for each reason, for each recession since 1969.  
The contribution of each flow is measured, in accordance with equation (10), by 
multiplying the difference in the log flow relative to its start of recession value by the 
initial share in unemployment of that flow at the start of the recession.   21
  The results of this exercise reveal that there is a great deal of richer detail 
underlying the aggregate analyses performed by Shimer and ourselves.  First and 
foremost, the decomposition indicates that the most important flow in all but the last two 
recessions was the job loser inflow rate.  In addition, the job loser inflow contributed to a 
non-trivial degree in the 1990 recession, and was very prominent in the first five quarters 
of the 2001 unemployment ramp-up.
18  Thus, recent claims such as “In the modern U.S. 
economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs” (Hall, 2005b) are not supported 
by the CPS data.
19 
  Moreover, figure 11 confirms that the aggregate picture presented in figure 3 
masks important heterogeneity in the cyclical effects of each individual inflow rate. 
Specifically, it can be seen that the contribution to recession unemployment due to job 
leavers is systematically negative because the leaver inflow rate is procyclical.  This 
serves to offset part of the increase in unemployment due to increased job loss.   
Figure 11 also provides some insight into why the aggregate inflow rate performs 
relatively poorly in explaining the increase in unemployment in recent recessions.  The 
contribution of the inflow rate from non-participation declined from a positive effect in 
the 1969, 1973, and 1979 recessions, to mildly positive in the 1981 and 1990 recessions, 
to negative in the 2001 recession.  This is important to emphasize as, from a theoretical 
perspective, macroeconomists are typically most interested in unemployment inflows that 
                                                 
18 Note that our choice to weight by pre-recession unemployment shares errs on the side of understating the 
importance of the job loser inflow.   
19 Hall’s conclusion is based partly on the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).  Because 
JOLTS began in December 2000, it missed part of the ramp-up to the most recent recession.  Furthermore, 
the JOLTS data for that recession seem to be at odds with information from other surveys, including our 
evidence from the CPS.  A careful comparison of what multiple sources of labor market data have to say 
about the last recession would be a very worthwhile research project.   22
originate from employment rather than non-participation.  Indeed, Shimer’s practice of 
referring to the unemployment inflow rate as the “separation rate” reflects this focus. 
  Turning to outflows, we can see from figure 11 that the reason aggregate outflows 
explain so much of the variation in unemployment is because all of the constituent 
outflows by reason cause unemployment to move in the same direction – that is, up in a 
recession.  In addition, we see that the most important outflow is the outflow rate for job 
losers.  This is to be expected, as job losers represent a substantial fraction of the 
unemployment pool.  That aside, however, the losers outflow rate is conspicuously 
dominant in the 1990 recession, again suggesting that this recession was especially 
different from the others in the sample period. 
  A question that arises at this point is the extent to which the disaggregated 
analysis is important.  Surely, one might argue, it nevertheless aggregates to the same 
story mentioned in section 2.B?  Our view, however, is that the disaggregated analysis 
culminating in figure 11 affords a more nuanced and illuminating view of unemployment 
flows, especially with regard to the inflows.  It is not clear what economic hypothesis is 
being assessed when one observes the cyclicality of the aggregate inflow rate, which is a 
weighted average of a number of sub-inflow rates.   However, the economics becomes 
clearer, and very intuitive, when one looks at inflows by reason.  The job leaver inflow 
into unemployment falls in all recessions for the same reason that the quit rate does – 
presumably because workers find it harder then to find attractive new jobs.  The job loser 
inflow rate rises in all recessions for the same reason that the layoff rate does – because 
firms want to employ fewer workers in a recession; they are unable (especially in the 
more severe recessions) to achieve the intended employment reductions merely by   23
allowing workers to quit; and they therefore lay off more workers, many of whom then 
experience unemployment. 
 
3.  Summary and Discussion 
Our effort to replicate and extend Shimer’s “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of 
Unemployment” has confirmed that procyclicality of the hazard rate for exiting 
unemployment plays an important role in cyclical unemployment.  Contrary to Shimer’s 
conclusions, however, we have shown that even his own methods and data also indicate 
an important role for countercyclical inflows into unemployment.  This finding is further 
strengthened by our refinements of Shimer’s methods of correcting the official Current 
Population Survey labor force series for the 1994 redesign of the CPS and for time 
aggregation bias.  In addition, we have conducted a disaggregated analysis that 
recognizes the large unemployment inflows from non-participation in the labor force and 
also distinguishes employment-to-unemployment inflows stemming from job losing and 
job leaving.  The disaggregated results highlight the particularly important role of job loss 
inflows to unemployment in accounting for increased unemployment in most recessions.  
Thus, in contrast to both Darby et al.’s (1986) pronouncement that “The Ins Win” and 
Shimer’s opposite conclusion that the outs win, we find that everyone’s a winner. 
At a basic level, then, our paper suggests that a complete understanding of 
cyclical unemployment requires an explanation of countercyclical unemployment inflow 
rates as well as procyclical outflow rates.  Accordingly, the many recent analyses cited in 
our second paragraph that overlook cyclical inflows may be ill-advised.  By the same   24
token, earlier efforts to explain why unemployment inflows rise in a recession (e.g., 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Cole and Rogerson, 1999) remain potentially relevant. 
In the remainder of this section, however, we want to emphasize that the precise 
economic interpretation of statistical decompositions such as equation (3) is not as clear 
as it might seem.  Up until now, we have followed the literature in interpreting the 
decompositions as answering the question “how much of the increase in unemployment 
in a recession is due to changes in inflows and outflows.”   In what follows, we show that 
such an interpretation is not the only possible reading of decompositions based on (3), 
and that different models of the labor market imply different interpretations. 
We motivate this point with the following metaphor.  Imagine a traffic 
intersection at which a queue of automobiles awaits a green light.  The light stays green 
long enough in each cycle to allow an outflow of five cars to leave the queue before the 
light turns red again.  Ordinarily, only a moderate number of cars is backed up at the 
light.  But suppose some event – say, construction on an alternate route – ramps up the 
inflow of cars to this intersection.  If nothing happens to keep the green light on longer, 
then the queue gets longer, and each car’s wait to get through the intersection becomes 
longer. 
  Now just for the moment, think of the queue of backed-up cars as unemployment, 
and think of the five cars going through each green light as the outflow from 
unemployment.  When the inflow increased, the stock of unemployment increased, and 
so did the average duration of unemployment.  If an analysis such as ours or Shimer’s 
were applied here, it would attribute much of the increased unemployment to a decreased 
exit rate even though nothing actually changed in the outflow process.  The proximate   25
cause of both the increased unemployment level and the increased duration was the 
increased inflow.
20 
  Thus, the traffic metaphor illustrates a possibility worth considering when 
reacting to statistical decompositions of the ins and outs of unemployment.  Although 
analyses like ours and Shimer’s attempt to separate the contributions of inflows and 
outflows, the inflows and outflows may be inherently inseparable.  It could be, for 
example, that congestion from increased inflows causes outflow hazard rates to become 
lower.
21   
  This latter possibility has received little attention in the previous literature on 
unemployment flows, perhaps because of the literature’s focus on search and matching 
models of the aggregate labor market (Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).  
In these models, the number flowing out of unemployment is increasing in the number of 
unemployed workers, as well as in the number of job vacancies.  The matching function 
that describes this relationship is meant to capture frictions that prevent firms and 
workers from quickly finding (suitable) partners for an employment relationship.  Under 
the typical specification of this matching function, a greater number of unemployed 
workers (the denominator of the outflow hazard) will raise the number flowing out of 
unemployment (the numerator of the outflow hazard) so that the outflow rate will not 
itself depend on the number unemployed.  Put in the language of the traffic metaphor, the 
green light stays on longer when more cars are waiting at the intersection.  According to 
                                                 
20 Note also that, just as the wait until going through the green light would increase for all cars regardless of 
whether they had arrived from the usual route or from the obstructed alternate route, unemployment 
duration would increase for all the unemployed – job losers, job leavers, and labor force entrants – just as 
found in the analyses by Baker (1992), Shimer, and ourselves. 
21 Another example of interaction between inflows and outflows, discussed above in section 2.D, is that 
cyclical changes in the composition of the inflow to unemployment (especially the increased share of 
permanent job losers) cause a modest reduction in the outflow rate.     26
these models, then, changes in the outflow hazard will be driven only by exogenous 
variables, notably labor productivity.
22  In this theoretical framework, the mechanism 
encapsulated in the traffic metaphor does not arise.   
That particular theoretical perspective, however, is not the only conceivable 
economic interpretation of cyclical flows in the labor market.  Consider, for example, an 
alternative model in which firms face no friction in hiring unemployed workers; that is, 
firms may hire as many unemployed workers as they wish without incurring important 
search costs.
23  Then, given labor productivity, firms will choose directly the number of 
workers to hire out of the unemployment pool.  In the language of the traffic metaphor, 
how long the green light stays on is not determined by the number of cars waiting at the 
intersection.  Then, as in the traffic metaphor, increased unemployment due to increased 
inflows can mechanically reduce outflow hazard rates during recessions. 
Viewed through this lens, a more appropriate decomposition of unemployment 
flows might focus on changes in the level of the outflow, since these are independent of 
the number unemployed in the latter model.  It turns out that simple algebraic 
manipulation of equation (3), our framework for decomposing cyclical unemployment 
variation into inflows and outflows, provides such a decomposition: 
  % % 1
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This re-expression of equation (3) decomposes cyclical variation in log unemployment 
into an inflow component plus an outflow component involving the log change in the 
                                                 
22 Indeed, Shimer (2005a, p. 23) makes this point to justify his emphasis on flow hazard rates, rather than 
the levels of the unemployment flows. 
23 Such an assumption may not be an entirely ludicrous approximation, as the average duration of a vacancy 
is consistently less than one month in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ JOLTS dataset.   27
number flowing out of unemployment,  t tu f ~  (instead of the hazard rate for the outflow, 
ft).  The monthly version of the latter is plotted in figure 12, which illustrates a fact that 
may surprise some readers who have not encountered it before: Even though the hazard 
rate for exiting unemployment goes down in recessions, the number exiting 
unemployment goes up.  This fact, acknowledged by Shimer (2005a, p. 22), was 
previously documented in the gross flows data analysis by Blanchard and Diamond 
(1990, p. 118): “While the flow from unemployment to employment increases in a 
recession, the hazard rate decreases as the pool of unemployed increases proportionately 
more than the flow.” 
Given the countercyclicality of the number exiting unemployment, if one viewed 
unemployment flows solely in terms of the model motivating equation (10), one would 
conclude that more than the entirety of the cyclical variation in unemployment is 
accounted for by countercyclical inflows.  That is, one would declare that “The Ins Win” 
after all.  Our point, however, is not to deny the importance of reduced outflow hazard 
rates in recessions.  Our point is that, in order to assess the roles of inflows and outflows 
in cyclical unemployment, one must understand the economic determinants of both the 
ins and the outs. 
We believe the challenge to future theoretical work is to develop coherent and 
plausible models that can account for the full range of relevant empirical evidence.  In 
terms of the particular facts we hope to have clarified in this paper, theoretical analyses 
should explain why job-loss-induced inflows to unemployment increase at the beginning 
of a recession and why outflows do not increase enough to keep unemployment duration   28
from rising.
24  Our hunch is that cyclical movements in both the number of 
unemployment spells and their duration stem largely from shared causes.  Like Hall 
(1988), we think of the relatively low employment (and real wages) during a recession as 
reflecting a leftward shift in the derived demand for labor along a positively sloped 
effective labor supply curve.  Whatever it is that induces the leftward shift in labor 
demand motivates some firms to effect employment reductions through layoffs (many of 
which lead to unemployment) and also deters other firms from hiring enough to prevent a 
rise in the stock and duration of unemployment.  If the effective short-run labor supply 
curve were perfectly inelastic, then wages would drop enough either to prevent the burst 
of layoffs or to induce some firms quickly to hire up the laid-off workers.  Recognizing 
that real wage variation is not procyclical enough to prevent cyclical variation in 
employment and unemployment is another way of saying that the effective short-run 
labor supply curve is positively sloped rather than inelastic. 
 The key questions then become: (1) What causes labor demand to shift leftward 
during a recession, and (2) why is the effective short-run labor supply curve positively 
sloped?  We suspect that the answers to these questions also will deliver straightforward 
answers to why cyclical unemployment variation divvies up as it does between changes 
in inflow and outflow rates. 
                                                 
24 Of course, theoretical work also should endeavor to explain the cyclical features of other salient variables 
such as employment, hours of work, wage rates, vacancies, productivity, capital utilization, etc.   29
Appendix 
 
Discrete-Time Correction for Time Aggregation Bias in Aggregate Inflows 
 
We use an analogous method to Shimer's in discrete time.  That is, we essentially 








w are the weekly inflow and outflow probabilities and are assumed 
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weeks.  Like Shimer, we then make the further assumption that the labor force, 
ttt leu ≡+, is also constant within the interval.  This implies that we can rewrite (A.1) as: 
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Solving this equation forward four weeks yields the following non-linear equation: 
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 yields equation (7) in the main text. 
 
 
Discrete-Time Correction for Time Aggregation Bias in Inflows by Reason 
 
  The correction for inflows by reason is a simple extension to the above.  Now 
there are three difference equations to solve out – one for unemployment by each reason: 
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where i is the stock of non-participation.  We then again assume, like Shimer, that the 
labor force is constant in the month between CPS interviews.  It should be noted that this 
has the implication that the non-participation stock is also constant between months.  
Since the unemployment system implicit in the above is a closed one (all flows among 
unemployment, employment, and non-participation originate from one of these three   30
categories), the population (the sum of unemployment, employment, and non-
participation) is implicitly constant.   
 
Given this, equation (A.4) is just a non-linear system, which can be solved using 
conventional programs such as MatLab. 
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Figure 4: Month-by-Month Ratio of Short-Term Share of Unemployment in Incoming 
Rotation Groups to Full Sample 
 














































































































































Redesign IRG/Full Sample Short Term Share of Unemployment Mean post Feb 1994
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Log Inflow Rate (No Time Agg Correction)
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Figure 10: Logs of Employment, Non-Participation, and Unemployment as Fractions of 
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